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Some philosophers, whom I call immaterialists, believe that there are be-
sides material things also immaterial things, such as souls, ghosts, or a 
God. Others, whom I call materialists, believe that there are no such 
things but that there are only material things. Immaterialists can defend 
their view by providing evidence (e.g. by giving a teleological argument 
for the existence of God) or by reporting perceptual experiences of the 
things in question. Materialists can defend their view by criticising the 
arguments of the immaterialist one by one, by arguing that the immateri-
alist’s perceptual experiences are unreliable, and by giving arguments 
against the existence of the immaterial things in question, such as the ar-
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gument from evil against the existence of God. However, some material-
ists want to take a short cut by using what I call Sweeping Naturalistic Ar-
guments (SNAs). They try to defend materialism by putting forward 
metaphysical principles that support immaterialism because they exclude 
that a physical event may have a non-physical cause. In this article I shall 
criticise the SNA that claims that science has shown that the physical do-
main is causally closed. To pave the way I shall describe what it would be 
for a material event to have an immaterial cause.  
What would it be for a material event to have an immaterial 
cause? 
There are two ways in which a material event might have an immaterial 
cause: it might have an immaterial event cause or an immaterial agent 
cause.  
If a material event, M, has an immaterial event cause, then the com-
plete cause of the event at a certain time is either wholly or partially im-
material. (By saying that A caused B, or that A was a cause of B, I mean 
that A was the complete cause of B at a certain time or a part of it. An 
event usually has only one complete cause at a time but of course differ-
ent complete causes at different times.) The material event, M, has an 
event, C, as complete cause. C takes place earlier than M, and there is a 
causal process of which M and C are stages. C might be a wholly immate-
rial event, that is, it consists in an immaterial thing, e.g. a human soul, 
being in a certain way (i.e. having certain properties) at a certain time. Or 
C might be partially immaterial and partially material, that is, there is a 
material event and an immaterial event, at the same time, whose conjunct 
is the complete cause of M at that time. In that case immaterial and mate-
rial things co-operate in causing.  
If a material event, M, has an immaterial agent cause, then M has no 
preceding cause, it has no event cause at all. It does not occur by chance 
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or by accident either. Rather, its occurrence is due to an agent. It occur-
rence is an agent’s choice. (I have spelled this out in more detail in Wa-
chter 2003.) Some authors mean other things by an agent cause, but of the 
conceptions available only those along these lines claim that there is a way 
in which an event may come about besides event causation, and therefore 
only these require extra consideration here.  
Causal Closure 
Now let us address the argument from Causal Closure. Jaegwon Kim’s 
way of stating the principle of Causal Closure (CC) is this: ‘If you pick any 
physical event and trace out its causal ancestry or posterity, that will never 
take you outside the physical domain. That is, no causal chain will ever 
cross the boundary between the physical and the nonphysical.’ (Kim 
1998, p. 40) In other words, using ‘physical’ and ‘material’ synonymously, 
no material event, e.g. a brain event, has an immaterial cause. There is a 
weaker version of the principle which claims that if a material event has a 
cause, then that cause is wholly material. Further, one can formulate CC 
as a modal principle claiming that it is impossible that a material event has 
an immaterial cause. Let us call this the Modal Principle of Causal Clo-
sure. Unless indicated otherwise I shall mean by CC the non-modal prin-
ciple that no material event has an immaterial cause. (For different ver-
sions of CC see (Lowe 2000, p. 27-31) and (Montero 2003). However, my 
criticism should apply to any version of the principle that supports mate-
rialism. For defences of physicalism with appeal to CC see (Papineau 
1993, ch. 1) and (Melynk 2003).)  
In either version is CC incompatible with immaterialism. (It is com-
patible with the existence of immaterial things that do not causally inter-
act with material things, and in some versions it is also compatible with a 
material event having an immaterial cause besides its material cause (as 
defended by Lowe 2003), but here I want to consider only immaterialism 
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that assumes that there are material events that have an immaterial cause 
and no full material cause.) So any support for CC is support for material-
ism. One way to defend CC would be to criticise the immaterialist’s ar-
guments one by one. If there are no immaterial objects, then there is 
nothing immaterial that could cause material events and hence CC is true. 
But some materialists use CC for a Sweeping Naturalistic Argument. 
They want to defeat immaterialism quickly by defending CC without 
criticising the immaterialist’s arguments one by one. They say, for exam-
ple, that CC is a principle of rationality or that it is supported by the suc-
cess of science and that therefore we should reject immaterialism. If there 
are good such reasons for assuming CC then the Sweeping Naturalistic 
Argument from Causal Closure is successful. But I shall now argue that 
there are no such reasons.  
CC is usually defended with reference to science. This can be done in 
two ways. First, one may argue that CC is a principle of rationality or of 
science. Secondly, one may argue that CC is supported by the success of 
science.  
Kim points out, that ‘if you reject this principle [CC], you are ipso 
facto rejecting the in-principle completability of physics—that is, the pos-
sibility of a complete and comprehensive physical theory of all physical 
phenomena.’ Therefore, ‘no serious physicalist could accept such a pros-
pect’. (Kim 1998, 40) However, regardless of whether you would like to be 
a ‘serious physicalist’, the question is just why one should assume CC. It is 
true that if CC is false, then (assuming that immaterial events are not 
governed by laws of nature) there are events in the universe for which 
there is no complete scientific explanation, i.e. no explanation in terms of 
the laws of physics. If God moved away the stone from Jesus’ grave, then 
that movement of that stone has no complete scientific explanation. Do 
we have a reason to rule out this possibility? We need to look at the two 
arguments I just mentioned in more detail. The first argument claims that 
science or rationality presupposes CC, the second argument claims that 
CC is a result of science or is supported through the success of science. In 
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order to be able to tackle these arguments we need to discuss first briefly 
whether a material event’s having an immaterial cause would constitute a 
‘violation’ of the laws of nature.  
Material events with immaterial causes and the laws of nature 
One way in which science might support CC would be through discover-
ing laws of nature that entail CC. So what do laws of nature say about CC 
and about potential counter-instances to CC? There are three answers 
available: 
(1) Counter-instances to CC, i.e. cases where a material event has an im-
material cause, would be ‘violations’ of the laws in question and would 
show that some formula L, which was thought to be a law was not a law. 
Counter-instances to CC would falsify the laws. All evidence for the laws 
of nature is therefore evidence for CC. This would have been David 
Hume’s answer, as we can see from his treatment of miracles (Hume 
1748, 10,12).  
(2) Counter-instances to CC would be ‘violations’ of the laws of nature, 
but if they are non-repeatable counter-instances they would not falsify 
any laws.  
(3) Counter-instances to CC would not be ‘violations’ of the laws of na-
ture because laws do not entail regularities of succession, but they say 
which forces there are in what kind of situation, and also in cases that are 
counter-instances to CC there are the forces that the laws of nature de-
scribe.  
I have formed answer (2) in accordance with Richard Swinburne’s 
treatment of miracles as violations of the laws of nature (Swinburne 
1970). The reasoning behind it is this. Assume you have a lot of evidence 
for some formula L being a law of nature. L explains many experimental 
data, is simple, and fits with the other laws. But then you have evidence 
that some event C occurred that would be a counter-instance to L. If you 
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try to formulate a law that predicts C it becomes much more complicated 
or it yields many wrong predictions. In that case, Swinburne argues, L 
should still be taken to be a law and C should be regarded as a non-
repeatable counter-instance to L. Giving up L would be against the evi-
dence that supports L.  
Answer (3) is the one I endorse (and shall defend in more detail else-
where). It is widely assumed that laws entail regularities of the type 
‘events of type A are always (or so and so often) followed by events of 
type B’, which we may call Humean regularities. Against this, I think J.S. 
Mill got it right already in 1872 when he wrote ‘All laws of causation, in 
consequence of their liability to be counteracted, require to be stated in 
words affirmative of tendencies only, and not of actual results’ (Mill 1872, 
445). Consider, for example, the law of gravity F=G m1m2/d2 . This law 
does not say that bodies if situated in a certain way will move in a certain 
way. Rather it says that in a situation of a certain kind there is a force of a 
certain kind. It does entail a regularity; but not a Humean regularity but a 
regularity of the type ‘In a situation of type S there is always a force of 
type T’. Concerning the actual movement of bodies the law of gravity says 
only that a body will accelerate in a certain way if nothing else is acting on 
it. Thus it says something about the movement of bodies only in some of 
the cases where it applies. In many cases the law applies and claims that 
there is a certain force but it does not make a claim about how the bodies 
will actually move. The class of cases in which the law makes a claim 
about what kind of event will be followed by what kind of event is a sub-
class of the cases where the law applies. Many object to the Humean regu-
larity theory of laws now that laws are more than regularities, still accept-
ing the Humean assumption that laws entail (Humean) regularities (e.g. 
Armstrong 1983, 85). I, however, hold that laws do not entail Humean 
regularities at all. They entail regularities about what happens in all cases 
where nothing else than the objects referred to is acting but not regulari-
ties about what happens in all cases where the law applies.  
 6
It may be objected that although single laws on their own do not en-
tail regularities, all the laws together do. We can, for example, make pre-
dictions about the movement of a certain body taking into account not 
only gravitational forces but also electro-magnetic forces and others. But 
as for every prediction based on the law of gravity the phrase ‘if nothing 
else is acting on the things in question’ needs to be added, so this phrase 
has to be added to any prediction based on laws of nature. You may have 
good reasons for assuming that there are no further material things that 
will be acting on the things in question or for assuming that no God will 
act on the things in question, but the evidence that supports the laws of 
nature does not itself warrant this assumption. You need independent 
evidence for this, for example evidence that there are no souls that would 
act on the things in question, or that there is no God, or that God would 
not act on the things in question because it would be bad. Because laws do 
not say what things there are not, also the totality of all laws of nature do 
not entail Humean regularities. For that reason Mill was right when he 
said that all laws ‘require to be stated in words affirmative of tendencies 
only, and not of actual results’. I take forces to be a kind of tendency. For 
our purposes here it is enough to note that the laws of motion require to 
be stated in words affirmative of forces only, and not of actual move-
ments. (I leave it to another time to extend this to laws that are not con-
cerned with forces and hence with movement of bodies. A good discus-
sion of laws of conservation of energy in this vein is (Larmer 1988, ch. 5).)  
Imagine God moved the stone away from Jesus’ grave. Just like that, 
without using any material object in order to push it. Would this have 
been a violation of the laws of nature? The standard view says yes, assum-
ing that the laws of motion entail regularities of which this movement 
would be an exception. But what do the laws of motion say about this 
case? They say that there are certain forces, e.g. a gravitational force act-
ing on the stone. There is no reason to assume that God, in order to move 
the stone, abolished any of these forces. They were all there, God just 
overrode them. Therefore there was no violation of the laws of nature.  
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If (1) were correct then the evidence for the laws of nature we believe 
in would support CC. If answer (2) or answer (3) are correct, then answer 
(1) is false because counter-instances to CC would not falsify any laws. I 
conclude that answer (3) is correct. However, what I say in what follows 
could easily be adapted to the view that answer (2) is correct. Let us now 
consider the possible arguments for CC.  
Is Causal Closure a principle of science?  
Now consider the idea that CC is a principle of science or of rationality. 
Thus John Heil writes for example: ‘Modern science is premised on the 
assumption that the material world is a causally closed system.’ (Heil 
1998, p. 23) The idea is that science assumes that every material event has 
a material cause and that science could not proceed without this assump-
tion, perhaps comparable to how it could not proceed without using in-
duction.  
To this I reply first that science is only to a limited extent concerned 
with producing scientific explanations of single events. Perhaps history is 
concerned with what happened to the stone at Jesus’ grave and why it 
happened, and cosmology is looking for the true explanation of a certain 
supernova. But often science is concerned with more general questions, 
such as how a body accelerates if it falls down, how photosynthesis works, 
or how quantum theory is to be squared with the theory of general rela-
tivity. For such more general questions it is irrelevant whether some im-
material object once upon a time caused some material event. All you 
need is the assumption that in the relevant experiments no immaterial 
objects interfered. If there are ghosts messing around in your experi-
ments, then that will impede your scientific work, just as it will impede 
with your work if you do not manage to protect your experiments from 
other things acting in it. But that God once moved a stone or that souls 
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cause some material events in human brains would not prevent us from 
discovering the laws governing stones and elementary particles.  
What about the cases where science does look for explanations of par-
ticular events? Well, why should the fact that some events have immate-
rial causes and hence no law-based explanation prevent science from 
looking for law-based explanations? If there are counter-instances to CC, 
then science will not find true law-based explanations for these events be-
cause they have no such explanation, but nothing prevents science from 
looking for them. Furthermore, science may be able to find for some 
counter-instances to CC, for example for brain events that have immate-
rial causes (as claimed by Eccles 1994, ch. 6), that they have no complete 
material cause and thereby find evidence for the existence of certain im-
material objects. That would be an interesting discovery too.  
Are there any other ways in which CC might be a principle of science? 
Is the assumption of CC necessary for the search for laws of nature? No, 
the existence of some counter-instances to CC would not impede the 
search for laws as long as we can conduct experiments with the things in 
question in which no such counter-instances occur. And even if there 
were so many counter-instances to CC of a certain kind that we could not 
discover a certain law, they would prevent us from finding this law, but 
they would not prevent us from looking for this law.  
So I see no reason here for assuming that CC is a principle of science.  
Is Causal Closure supported by the success of science?  
Sometimes it is suggested that CC is supported by the success of science. 
Science has found material causes for many material events. And science 
can investigate what the cause of a certain material event was which is a 
candidate for being a counter-instance to CC. But this will not yield much 
support for CC because there are so many particular events in the past 
and in the future where science will never look for, and find, evidence 
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that they had material causes. More promising is the idea that CC is sup-
ported by the fact that science has made many successful predictions and 
is likely to do so in future, and by the fact that science has discovered laws 
of nature and is likely to do so in future.  
If a material event had an immaterial cause then its occurrence could 
not be predicted through knowledge of laws and of material events that 
took place earlier than the immaterial cause (except when there are laws 
that govern situations that are partly immaterial, but I ignore this possi-
bility here). That a scientific prediction, for example of an eclipse or of a 
spring tide, was successful shows, therefore, that no immaterial things 
intervened in the causal processes that led to the predicted event. That 
many scientific predictions were successful shows that often no immate-
rial things intervened in causal processes. That many scientific predic-
tions were made and few were unsuccessful shows that not often did im-
material things intervene in causal processes where clear predictions were 
calculable. Similarly, if it is likely that many scientific predictions in the 
future will be successful, then it is likely that not often will immaterial 
things intervene in causal processes where clear prediction are calculable. 
If, however, there are also many events for which thus far we cannot cal-
culate clear predictions based on the laws of physics, like some weather 
phenomena or some movements of animal bodies, then the high number 
of successful scientific predictions and the low number of unsuccessful 
predictions does not support the view that there are no material events 
with immaterial causes. It only shows for the sorts of events where we can 
calculate clear law-based predictions that immaterial things do not often 
intervene in the causal processes leading to them.  
That seems to me to be our situation. We can make many law-based 
predictions of eclipses, spring floods, etc., and most of them are success-
ful. But there are not only many events in the past whose causes we have 
not investigated and will never be able to investigate, there are also many 
events in circumstances where we are thus far unable to make predictions. 
For example, many events involving animals we cannot predict, such as 
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that the sparrow in front of my window just moved its wing as it did, that 
the cow ate this yellow flower rather than that one, or that I just whistled 
an A flat rather than an F. This is of course not in itself evidence for there 
being immaterial objects at work, but it means that for all these areas the 
success of science does not make it improbable that there are immaterial 
objects. The success of science is compatible with there being immaterial 
objects acting in these areas. Whether and in which immaterial objects we 
should believe depends on what evidence there is for them. If there is no 
positive evidence for them, then we should not believe in them. But if 
there is evidence, the success of science does not count against it. That is 
the answer to the question whether the success of science counts against 
the existence of immaterial objects in areas where we cannot make pre-
dictions. 
Moreover, the success of science does not even make it very improb-
able that sometimes there are immaterial things acting in circumstances 
where on other occasions in circumstances of a similar kind we can make 
successful predictions. If God moved away the stone from Jesus’ grave, 
how should that impede science today or how should it be in conflict with 
the results and the success of science? It does not conflict with science, 
and the reason for this is that it is what Swinburne calls a ‘non-repeatable’ 
event. All we need in order to be able to discover the laws of nature are 
experiments where we rightly assume that no immaterial objects inter-
fere. Knowledge of laws thus acquired allows us to know about certain 
events in certain circumstances that they would not occur unless some 
immaterial thing caused it. Historical evidence for the occurrence of such 
an event, e.g. that a certain man rose from the dead, is then evidence for 
the existence of an immaterial object that could cause such an event.  
Melynk (2003, p. 160-162) defends the SNA from CC arguing that 
since physics has found ‘sufficient physical causes for physical effects of 
very many kinds’ we should conclude by induction that CC is true. I reply 
that this conclusion is not justified by induction. We are justified by in-
duction when we conclude from the fact that there are certain forces act-
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ing in a certain case, that probably such forces are acting in all situations 
of the same kind. But Melynk’s reasoning is not of this kind, it is not a 
proper induction. As we are not justified in assuming that because often 
two things accelerate towards each other (because of gravitation), two 
things always accelerate towards each other, so we are not justified in as-
suming that because often material events have a full material cause, ma-
terial events always have a full material cause. Swinburne (1997, p. 237) 
makes a similar point: ‘Only if there was some well-confirmed formula 
which states after how much work scientists would achieve successful 
predictions in any field could we reasonably infer (if it follows from the 
formula) that they will obtain successful predictions in all fields if they 
work hard enough. There is no such formula. In its absence we must af-
firm that increasing success does not indicate future total success.’  
If you do not agree with my conception of laws of nature, consider 
this argument against Melynk. It is true that science has found full mate-
rial causes for many material events of many kinds. But that is in conflict 
neither with the assumption that certain events in the past had immaterial 
causes (e.g. the stone’s moving at Jesus’ grave), nor with the assumption 
that in certain areas (e.g. human brains) some events have immaterial 
causes. Let me explain. 
It would perhaps be in conflict with the assumption that certain 
events in the past had immaterial causes if science had searched for, and 
found, full material causes of the vast majority of events, but of course 
science has not done that. And that science has found material causes for 
events of many kinds, does not support Melynk’s point because the fact 
that events of a certain kind sometimes have material causes does not 
show that they always have material causes. To illustrate, the fact that the 
movement of pieces of iron is sometimes caused through gravitation does 
not show that it is always caused through gravitation; sometimes it is 
caused through magnetic forces. Events of the same kind can have causes 
of different kinds at different occasions. That is why there is no inductive 
support for CC here. 
 12
The fact that science has found full material causes for many material 
events of many kinds is not in conflict with the assumption that in certain 
areas some events have immaterial causes. For example, the assumption 
that some events in human brains are caused by human souls is not in 
conflict with science having discovered material causes of many sorts of 
material events outside human brains. This assumption would only be-
come improbable if science discovered full material causes of so many 
brain events that there were no room for immaterial causes. That is why 
there is no inductive support for CC here. Science has discovered for 
many kinds of material events what kind of material event they cause if 
nothing else is acting in the situation, but it has not discovered that mate-
rial events never have immaterial causes. (For a further argument against 
the claim that the success of science supports CC, see Montero 2003.)  
What people who say that science has shown that there are no mate-
rial events that have immaterial causes might have in mind is that science 
has found material causes of some kinds of material events that some men 
formerly believed to have immaterial causes. Imagine, for example, that 
some men believed that northern light is caused by the god Thor when he 
is jealous. The discovery that northern lights are caused by interactions of 
energetic particles from outside the atmosphere with atoms of the upper 
atmosphere does something to show that this is false: it shows that a 
northern light has no immaterial causes later than the ones identified by 
science. However, this does little to show that there are no counter-
instances to CC at all. The evidence for the hypothesis that Thor causes 
northern lights was very weak to start with, because there is little evidence 
that Thor exists and that he has the power and a reason to cause northern 
lights, and there may be other counter-instances to CC for whose exis-
tence there is better evidence. What needs to be investigated is how 
strong the evidence for, say the existence of human souls or of God is, and 
whether we can think of material causes of the alleged counter-instances 
to CC and whether the explanations of the alleged counter-instances to 
CC in terms of immaterial causes are better than the ones in terms of ma-
terial causes.  
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Conclusion 
I have argued that it is neither a principle nor a result of science that there 
are no counter-instances to the principle of Causal Closure. The Sweep-
ing Naturalistic Argument from Causal Closure based on science is un-
successful.  
There is another popular SNA, claiming that, because immaterial things 
are so different from each other, it is impossible that there is causal inter-
action between them. John Heil, for example, writes ‘if minds and bodies 
are distinct kinds of substance, it is hard to see how such causal interac-
tion could occur’ (Heil 1998, 23). My view on this, which I cannot defend 
here, is that the only way to show that there are no such interactions is by 
showing that there are no immaterial things. I suggest therefore that the 
materialist, like his immaterialist opponent, has to use non-sweeping ar-
guments. He has to criticize the arguments for the existence of God (see 
e.g. Swinburne 2004), souls (see e.g. Foster 1991; Swinburne 1997), etc., 
one by one, and he can further support his claim by giving positive argu-
ments against the existence of such things, e.g. the argument from evil 
against the existence of God (see. e.g. Howard-Snyder 1996). But there is 
no short cut for materialists.  
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